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Tämä opinnäytetyö on tehty ABB Oy:lle, Sähkönjakelun automaatiojärjestelmät -
yksikköön.  
Työssä selvitetään kuinka tiedon oikeellisuus voidaan todentaa luotettavasti ja mitä 
mahdollisuuksia todentamiseen on SCADA-järjestelmässä. Työn painopisteenä on teo-
reettisen osan selvittäminen siten, että joitain osia teoriasta voidaan soveltaa käytäntöön 
MicroSCADA-järjestelmässä. 
Teoriaosuus keskittyy kommunikaatiossa käytettäviin todentamisrutiineihin sekä sellai-
siin älykkäiden kenttälaitteiden (IED) luomiin mahdollisuuksiin, joita voidaan hyödyn-
tää monitoroinnissa ja valvomon käyttöliittymän luomisessa. 
Viimeinen osa esittelee muutaman tiedon oikeellisuuden todentamisrutiinin käytännön 
toteutusta MicroSCADA-järjestelmässä. 
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This thesis has been made for ABB Oy, Substation Automation Systems. 
The purpose of this thesis was to clarify the possibilities for data validation in the 
SCADA system. The emphasis of this thesis was clarify theoretically basic valida-
tion routines that are in use but also other possibilities what could be implemented 
to the MicroSCADA 
The first part deals with SCADA system in general and clarifies abstracts, needs 
and challenges including in the SCADA. The second part concentrates on data 
transfer and communication and clarifies how the validation is executed in the 
protocols. Third part discussed Intelligent Electronic Devices and monitoring sys-
tems but also possibilities which these two can create if they are use together. 
As a result of the thesis routines are presented which have been chosen to be im-
plemented to the MicroSCADA system.  
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TERMS AND DEFINITIONS 
ABB  ABB is a global company in power and automation technologies 
AC  Alternating Current 
CB   Circuit Breaker 
CBM               Circuit Breaker Monitor  
CT  Current Transformer 
DC  Direct Current, Disconnector 
DFR                Digital Fault Recorder 
DI  Digital Input 
DO  Digital Output 
DPR                Digital Protective Relay 
DR  Disturbance recorder 
IEC  The International Electrotechnical Commission 
IED  Intelligent Electronic Device 
IEEE  Institution of Electrical and Electronics Engineering 
KCL  Kirchhoff's Current Law  
MADMD  Maximum Allowable Double Measurement Discrepancy 
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PLC   Programmable logic controller 
RTU  Remote Terminal Unit 
SCADA Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition 
VT  Voltage Transformer 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
In computer sciences data validation (DV) is a commonly used term of ensuring 
that a program or application operates correctly and reliably. Typically DV consist 
of certain routines or methods which ensure a correctness of the input signal. In-
correct or invalid data can be replaced by a new one, it can be marked as suspi-
cious or the value is eliminated.  
In the power system DV can be done in several automation levels and DV is not 
unambiguous. The characteristics of the process are miscellaneous in power sys-
tem so the DV should be built in such a way that it can separate the changes be-
tween normal and fault state. 
This thesis consists of four parts. The first part represents some typical require-
ments for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) system and some 
typical problems existing. The second part deals with data signals and communi-
cations. This part introduces data signals and some communications methods but 
also how the data is typically validated in protocols. The third part handles Intelli-
gent Electronic Devices (IEDs) in general and discusses some possibilities how 
these devices can be used in DV. Real-time monitoring and data acquisition are 
also dealt with in such a way, how to build a reliable monitoring system. The last 
part of this thesis presents the data validation routines implemented into Mi-
croSCADA. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
2   BACKGROUND 
This chapter introduces shortly some terms and concepts related to the data vali-
dation so that it is easier to understand what the data validation means and why it 
is important. 
2.1  Knowledge, Information and Data 
Knowledge is defined by Collins Cobuild English Language Dictionary as: 
 ”Knowledge is information and understanding about  
 subject which a person has in his or her mind or which 
 is shared by all human beings.”(Collins Cobuild 1987, 803) 
Based on this definition knowledge can be thought a as consisting of the informa-
tion e.g. what we can see on computer´s screen. 
In the same dictionary the information is defined as follow: 
  ”If you have information on or about something,  
  you know something about it.”(Collins Cobuild 1987, 748) 
Based on these two definitions the data can be understood. The definition of the 
data is: 
 ”Data is information, usually in the form of facts or  
 statistics that you can  analyze, or that you use to do  
 further calculations”(Collins Cobuild 1987, 357) 
The conclusion is that data does not take a stand on information which informa-
tion, which it encases. The data transfer is needed if the information is wanted to 
move from one location to another. If the contents of the data have been inter-
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preted and understood, it can be called information. The interpretation can be exe-
cuted in many ways: 
 •  In the ear the pressure waves are interpreted into the electrical  
  impulses and the brains create the information based on these 
  impulses 
 •  People have been agreed that certain sounds consist of certain  
  words and these certain words transmit the information 
 •  Information between electronic devices consists of bits,   
  bytes and words 
 •  That transceiver and receiver could understand each other their  
  language must be the same. This common language is called  
  protocol. (Nieminen 2008) 
The figure 1 clarifies the terms explained above. 
 
Figure 1: Knowledge – Information – Data. (Nieminen 2008) 
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Data is typically the result of different measurements and can be the basis for 
graphs, images, or observations of variables which finally create the functional 
applications.  
In the SCADA system the data is collected from IEDs or RTUs. The SCADA 
application and IEDs create the information on their screens and the operator as-
sociates as understanding of the state of the process. 
2.2  Validation 
A following statement clarifies the meaning of the validation: 
 ”To validate a statement or claim means to prove 
  or confirm that it is true or correct; A fairly formal word.” 
 (Collins Cobuild 1987, 1615) 
Consequently, the validation is the process of checking if something meets a cer-
tain criterion. 
In engineering or as part of a quality management system, validation confirms that 
the needs of an external customer or user of a product, service, or system are met. 
The validation is ensuring "Am I building the right product?" 
In computer terminology, validation refers to the process of data validation, ensur-
ing that data inserted into an application satisfies pre-determined requirements i.e. 
stated length, character requirements and other defined input criteria. It may also 
ensure that only data that is either true or real can be entered into a database. 
Validation refers to finding out bugs in the hardware but also proving absence of 
certain critical bugs which may not have workarounds and may lead to project 
cancellation or product recall. Table 1 defines some typical validation routines 
used in computer sciences: 
13 
 
Table1: Typical validation routines in computers 
 
2.3 SCADA System 
SCADA is an abbreviation from words Supervisory Control And Data Acquisi-
tion. SCADA systems are composed of networks, electronic devices, measuring 
sensors, switching devices etc. The structure of the system enables to control and 
manage processes locally or remotely, analyze the data, generate alarms and send 
them to different locations etc. The term SCADA is often used to define the sys-
tem that are geographically dispersed. 
A legacy system consists of a central host or master, one or more data gathering 
and control units, also known as RTUs, and a collection of standard and/or custom 
software used to monitor and control remotely located field data elements. Figure 
2 shows a typical structure of modern SCADA for electrical transmission and dis-
tribution. 
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Figure 2:  SCADA system example. (Fortune Automation, 2010) 
2.4  Requirements for SCADA 
The abnormal electrical conditions in the power system are detected and handled 
by protection relays. The ability to correctly restore power system back to the 
normal operation heavily depends on both a configuration of the relays and under-
standing of the power system topology. (Djokic et al, 2005, 2) 
End-users and electric utilities are becoming increasingly concerned about quality 
and reliability of the power system and all disturbances decrease the total quality 
of the electricity. Automation has replaced a local maintenance staff at the substa-
tion and automation has also increased the reliability of the distribution but it can-
not make controls and operations without right parameterization and configuration 
of the applications and devices. In order to handle these things the maintenance 
staff in the control room must still have a good perception of the power system.  
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As a result of the technology developments, new requirements for monitoring and 
control can be defined. The system changes should be tracked and monitored very 
closely, reliably and events and consequences are needed to analyze automatically 
so that it enables to react to system chances quickly. This creates pressure to the 
applications and device vendors. Nowadays the situation at the substation is quite 
challenging especially for the system integrators because of a wide range of the 
different devices and vendors. This creates needs to develop controls and monitor-
ing systems continuously. 
2.5  Challenges 
A power system topology is defined by i.e. the circuit breaker status. The system 
topology is updated automatically by the operation of the protection relays or in 
some cases it is made manually. No matter what the convention is, it is possible 
that topological data does not reflect the real switching status of power devices in 
the field. (Djokic et al. 2005, 2) If the measurement value is bad it could cause are 
remarkable error in the long time period. Wrong energy measurement causes er-
rors in daily, monthly and yearly reports. 
The operators may also have difficulties to make decisions to restore portions of 
the power system that may have been automatically disconnected by the intelli-
gent electronic devices (IEDs), especially if the operators do not have a clear way 
of verifying the system conditions or related topology. (Djokic et al. 2005, 1) The 
problem with SCADA is not a lack of the data. There is more data available than 
it is utilized but the problem is how to use it rationally. 
Old RTUs are not designed to track the analog measurements in true real time. 
Only the reporting by exception when certain thresholds are exceeded is imple-
mented. During electrical faults in the network e.g. short circuit fault, analog sig-
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nals change very quickly, and only a closer tracking can give the information 
about the phase relationships and dynamic changes in the signal magnitudes. If 
the faults are needed to detect with RTUs the external disturbance recorders have 
to be used. If new IEDs are used, it gives more opportunities to react the faults 
and get robust information. (Djokic et al. 2005, 1) 
One major problem is also the incompatibility of devices and non-existence of a 
relevant standard that would unify forms of data produced by the variety of de-
vices. The information from devices differs between protocols and for that reason 
it is not simple to get devices to communicate with each other. In the future a new 
substation communication standard, IEC 61850, may facilitate this problem. 
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3  DATA TRANSFER AND COMMUNICATION  
This chapter discusses some principles of the data transferring. The first part in-
troduces shortly serial and parallel transmission. These techniques are still in use 
but it could be said that especially the pure serial transmission is already old fash-
ioned technique in the substation because the needs and demands of communica-
tion have increased. The serial transmission cannot transfer enough data as 
quickly as it is required.  
3.1  Overview 
Many different communication protocols have been developed in the last decades.  
Different solutions and devices set up different demands for the signals and com-
munication. The figure 3 shows some protocols which can be used for communi-
cation in the electrical transmission and distribution automation systems. 
Figure 3. Protocols used for communication in the substations. (Nieminen 2008) 
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3.2  Network Topologies 
The communication network can be built in several ways. Some of the common 
structures used in the SCADA system are represented in a simplified manner in 
figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Typical network topologies 
3.3  Communication 
The traditional solution in digital data transferring is serial or parallel transmis-
sion. In serial communication the data is sent one bit at a time from the transmitter 
to the receiver and in parallel communication several data bits or entire byte are 
transferred simultaneously over several parallel channels. The figure 5 shows the 
difference. 
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Figure 5. The basic idea of the parallel and serial transmission 
Parallel communication is used over short distances, typically inside computers. 
The parallel transmission is a quick way to transfer data but in a long distance it 
needs more wires which makes the error handling more challenging and therefore 
the costs increase. 
Serial transmission is usually used to transfer data between two computer systems 
or systems where the transferring distance is long. The protocols e.g. SPA, used in 
substation automation is based on a serial mode. Serial transmission can be either 
synchronous or asynchronous. In synchronous transmission, groups of bits are 
combined into frames and frames are sent continuously, with or without data, to 
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the receiver. In asynchronous transmission, groups of bits are sent as independent 
units with opening/closing flag and no data link synchronization, to allow for arbi-
trary size gaps between frames. However, start/stop bits maintain physical bit 
level synchronization once detected. Figure 6 clarifies the situation  
Figure 6. Typical asynchronous frame include opening/closing flag.  
               (Nieminen 2008) 
The SPA bus, which was originally designed as a field bus for a distributed net-
work application, is a typical example of asynchronous serial communication. Its 
data packet is shown in figure 7. 
Figure 7. The data packet used in SPA-bus 
In asynchronous transmission, the start bit must be included to the packet and that 
bit notifies when the data arrives to the receiver. After the start bit, there are seven 
data bit and a parity bits is also added. The parity bit is a mark which is added to 
ensure that the number of bits with the value ”1” in a set of bits is even or odd. 
Parity bits are used as the simplest form of the error detecting code. The last bit of 
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the packet is the stop bit which separates the different data packet from each 
other.  
For example, in the SPA bus it is assumed that the slave device has a self-initiated 
need to talk to the master but the master is aware of the data contained in the 
slaves and can request required data. In addition, the master can send data to the 
slave. The request by the master can be performed either by sequence polling (i.e. 
for event information) or only demand. (SPA-Bus Communication V2.5 2001, 4) 
3.4  TCP/IP Network and IEC 61850 
TCP/IP is the set of communications protocols used for the Internet and other 
similar networks. It is named after two of the most important protocols in it: the 
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) and the Internet Protocol (IP), which were 
the first two networking protocols defined in this standard. TCP/IP network is 
usually built as a ring which improves the reliability of the network, because a 
failure in a single network cable or switch do not interrupt all communication. 
IEC 61850 is quite a new standard for the design of electrical substation automa-
tion. It includes a broad range of services and tools for monitoring, control, and 
protective relays. The one of biggest benefits with IEDs supporting IEC 61850 is 
that they can communicate directly with each other over the TCP/IP network. The 
IEC 61850 includes all layers of OSI model so it also includes the developed error 
detection techniques. The structure of the standard is shown in figure 8. 
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Figure 8. Structure of the IEC 61850. (IEC 61850 Standard) 
As it can be noticed IEC 61850 is a very versatile standard and only a small part 
of it deals with the data transmission. The part 8-1 includes the TCP/IP protocols 
and this layer includes also the error detection from the messages.  
3.5  Error Detection in Data Transfer  
A number of different routines have been developed for detecting and correcting 
errors from the messages. The aim of an error detection technique is to enable the 
reception of a message transmitted through a noisy channel, to determine whether 
the message has been corrupted. Some of the most typical solutions are discussed 
in the next chapter. 
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3.5.1  Checksum  
A checksum is a common method where the transmitter calculates a value, (also 
known as a checksum) that is a part of the message, and appends it to the mes-
sage. The receiver can then use the same method to calculate the checksum of the 
received message and compare it with the appended checksum to see if the mes-
sage was correctly received. The checksum is typically used by upper layer proto-
cols, e.g. the checksum is included to the IP protocol. 
3.5.2  Cyclic Redundancy Check 
A cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is one of the most used techniques for error 
detection in data communications. The CRC technique is used to protect blocks of 
data (frames). The CRC is based on polynomial arithmetic, in particular, on com-
puting the remainder of dividing one polynomial in GF(2) (Galois field with two 
elements) by another. Using the CRC technique, the transmitter appends an extra 
n- bit sequence to every frame called Frame Check Sequence (FCS). The FCS 
holds redundant information about the frame that helps the transmitter to detect 
errors in the frame. It has to be noticed that FCS can include many other check-
sums than only the CRC. (Cyclic Redundancy Check. 2009, 1-3) A position of the 
CRC in frame is represented in figure 9. 
 
 
Figure 9. The block where the CRC has been added. (Nieminen 2008) 
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3.5.3  Hamming Distance 
The hamming distance (HD) is a measure for how secure a protocol is against 
misinterpretation of a packet. HD=4 tells us that at least 4 bits can to be wrong, 
the checksum calculations still matches, in order for it to be mistaken as a valid 
packet. The basic idea is that if more error-correcting bits are included in a mes-
sage, and if these bits can be arranged in such a way that different incorrect bits 
produce different error results, then bad bits could be identified. In a 7-bit mes-
sage, there are seven possible single bit errors, so e.g. three error control bits 
could potentially specify not only that an error occurred but also which bit caused 
the error. The mathematical model is not simple and is not discussed further here. 
(Signal Processing Laboratory 2004). 
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4  DATA SOURCES AND CONDITIONING 
4.1  Instrument Transformers - Analog Inputs 
Instrument transformers are used both to protect personnel and apparatus from 
high voltages and to allow reasonable insulation levels and current-carrying ca-
pacity in relays, meters and instruments. The performance of instrument trans-
former is critical in protection relaying since the relays can only be as accurate as 
the information supplied to them by the instrument transformer. Standard instru-
ment transformers and protective relays are normally rated 1 or 5 A; 100, 110 or 
120 V and 50, 60 Hz. 
Where the protective relays operate only on current or voltage magnitude, the 
relative direction of current flow in the transformer windings is not important. The 
relative direction, and therefore polarity, must be known where the relays com-
pare the sum or difference of two currents or the interactions of several currents or 
voltages. 
The analog input signal must first be sampled and digitized before it can be used 
numerically. This converting is made by using an analog to digital converter 
(ADC). The result is binary numbers representing consecutive sampled values (1 
and 0) of the input signal. After converting, the sampled values are transferred to 
the processor, which executes different numerical calculation on them. These cal-
culations typically involve multiplying the input values by constants and adding 
the products together. If necessary, the results of these calculations, which now 
represent sampled values of the filtered signal, are output through a digital to ana-
log converter (DAC) to convert the signal back to analog form. Filtering is dealt 
with later on. Figure 10 shows the sequence of the ADC-DAC. 
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All the sampled AC signals immediately after the first analog to digital conversion 
are usually recorded even if the relay or recording device uses decimated samples 
for other functions which are desirable (The working group 2006, 20). The figure 
10 represent the AD converting process. 
Figure 10: Sequence of the AD-converting. 
4.1.1  Current Transformers 
A current transformer (CT), like any other transformer, has a primary winding, a 
magnetic core, and a secondary winding. The alternating current (AC) flowing in 
the primary circuit (cable) and produces a magnetic field in the core and finally 
core induces a current flow in the secondary winding circuit. A primary objective 
of current transformer design is to ensure that the primary and secondary circuits 
are efficiently coupled, so that the secondary current bears an accurate relation-
ship to the primary current. 
A CT reduces high current so that the measurement can be connected to measur-
ing and recording instruments. A CT also isolates the measuring instruments from 
high voltage in the monitored circuit. 
CTs have good frequency response and normally do not require any special atten-
tion when operated in their recommended range of one to twenty times rated cur-
rent and at rated burden or less. Perhaps the only unanticipated degradation in the 
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input signal will be due to the capacitance of the cables. This can introduce errors 
in magnitude at several kilohertz and errors in phase angle at several hundred 
Hertz. (The working group 2006, 17) 
In many situations it is easier to measure current than voltage. Current circuits are 
low impedance paths that are less susceptible to induced signals or noise, whereas 
voltage circuits are high impedance paths that are more susceptible. (The working 
group 2006, 17) 
In medium and large area substations, the burden on CTs is mainly determined by 
the cable burden. The reduction of the relay burden with the use of digital relays is 
useful but usually the cable burden is the greater part of the total CT burden, with 
either digital or most electromechanical relays. However, some electromechanical 
relays, such as sensitive ground overcurrent relays, with settings on the order of 
0.5 Amp will impose a significant burden to the CT circuits. (The working group 
2006, 17) 
4.1.2   Voltage Transformers 
Voltage transformers (VTs) do not have good frequency response. The capaci-
tance of the cable between the voltage transformer and the relay will further de-
grade the input signal. But, depending on the frequency, this can be minimal com-
pared to the errors due to the frequency response of the specific VT. (The working 
group 2006, 17) 
4.2  Interferences and Coupling 
Usually the measured signals are electrical and therefore include various interfer-
ences. The signal power is generally that small that interferences may generate 
significant errors to the signal transmission line. Interferences might cause several 
kind of harm for automation devices, like wrong operation, interrupted status val-
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ues or other signal errors. In the worst case the whole measurement system might 
be corrupted.  
The problem with interferences can be divided into three groups: the sources of 
interferences, the coupling of interferences and exposed devices. The closer in-
spection of these groups is present in the following chapters. 
4.2.1  Sources 
To eliminate the source of interference is the most effective method to remove the 
interference. For example, if the sparking has been eliminated from the tripping 
relay, it also eliminates the interferences from the measurement circuits. Typical 
interference sources in low and middle frequencies (<100kHz) are: 
(Aumala 2002, 144-145) 
• Power cables 
• Solenoids and relays 
• Transformers 
• Motors  
• The operation of circuit breakers and disconnectors 
• Climate 
4.2.2  Coupling 
Coupling problems can be managed by assemblies and right connection solutions. 
The practical solution is to take notice of these problems at the same time as 
measurement arrangements are planned. The good planning is necessary because 
interferences could couple to the measurement circuits from several sources such 
as signal conductor. (Aumala 2002, 144-145) 
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1. Galvanic coupling 
Galvanic coupling occurs especially if the same paths are used for high current 
but also for low current. This kind of solution should be avoided and it is recom-
mended that the different route is used for a device power supply and signal ca-
bles. (Aumala 2002, 144-145) 
2. Inductive coupling 
The inductive coupling occurs via the magnetic field. As the current flows in the 
cable, it generates a magnetic field around the cable. The change of the current 
induces voltages to the loops in the circuit. That is why the loops should be 
avoided. The loop could be possible if the cable is earthed at both ends. (Aumala 
2002, 144-145) 
Nowadays most signal cables are of twisted pair type and in that way the induced 
voltage causes less interferences for the cable. (Aumala 2002, 144-145) 
3. Capacitive coupling 
Capacitive coupling occurs due to the distributed capacitances between circuits. 
The current flows via the distributed capacitances as the voltage changes. The 
coupling can be eliminated if the interference source is placed far enough from the 
signal circuits. This means that instrument cables are not recommended to be as-
sembled to the same cable ladder with high voltage cables. (Aumala 2002, 144-
145) 
4. Radiation 
Radiation is a very complicated event and the radiation sources are increasing. 
EMC, electromagnetic compatibility, is nowadays a more and more important 
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case because the electric devices increase all the time and they are at the both time 
the sources of the interferences but also sensitive for the radiation. The protection 
from straight radiation is to build the metallic cover around the device and cables 
which are left outside of the cover should be also covered by earthed shield sepa-
rately. (Aumala 2002, 144-145) 
4.3  Digital Inputs 
In the RTUs and IEDs, digital inputs mean typically the digital signals from the 
external contacts i.e. limit switches of the CB for position indication or internal 
element status indications of the device e.g. low SF6 gas pressure in CB breaking 
chamber. Although this input can be a simple contact, it deserves considerable 
attention because these signals are very important in the analysis process. (The 
working group 2006, 18) 
4.4  Filtering 
Filtering is an important part of the signal handling and consequently linked with 
data validation. This chapter introduces briefly and in a simplified way the basic 
ideas of the filtering. 
As mentioned earlier, interferences cause distortion to the signal. Figure 11 repre-
sents the situation, where the interferences have generated distortion in the signal. 
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Figure 11: Typical interferences in the voltage signal. (Nieminen 2008) 
Filtering means removing unwanted parts of the signal, such as random noise. On 
the other hand, filtering makes it possible to extract useful parts of the signal, such 
as the components lying within a certain frequency range. In order to manage 
these distorted signals, filtering has to be included in the receiver. The filtering of 
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the applied signals may be both analog and digital, and together with the sampling 
rate determines the frequency response of the recorded information. (The working 
group 2006, 19) 
There is a great variety of different kind of filters which have been developed over 
the years to meet the needs of various applications. Despite this variety, many 
filters are based on a few common characteristics. 
One principle is the frequency range of their pass band. A filter's pass band is the 
range of frequencies through which filter will pass an incoming signal. Signal 
frequencies lying outside the pass band are attenuated. Next chapter discusses 
only filtering of AC signals as they are used in IEDs. (Ramsden, 2001) 
4.4.1   Analog Signal Filtering of AC Signals 
Any digital device, including IED, must include an anti-aliasing feature, usually 
achieved using an analog filter. Anti-aliasing filtering eliminates higher frequen-
cies that would otherwise overlap the lower portion of the spectrum due to the 
finite sampling rates of digital devices. (The working group 2006, 19) 
One of the used theorems to determine the sampling rate of the device is the Ny-
quist sampling theorem: 
”The sampling frequency should be at least twice the highest frequency contained 
in the signal.” (Olshausen 2000, 1) 
Or in mathematical terms: 
        (1) 
Where fs is the sampling frequency (how often samples are taken per unit of time 
or space), and fc is highest frequency contained in the signal. (Olshausen 2000, 1) 
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Typically the sampling rate in IEDs variates from 4 samples/cycle to 356 sam-
ples/cycle. Digital Fault Recorders (DFRs) typically use a sampling rate of 16-128 
samples/cycle but some devices permit sampling rates of up to 384 samples/cycle. 
DFRs typically use higher sampling rates than relays since it is important to get 
accurate data for further analysis i.e. for the harmonic calculations. DFRs´ cut-off 
filters are set well above 1 kHz which yield comparatively good spectral coverage 
(The working group 2006, 19). 
Protection relays sample as low as 4 to 20 samples per cycle, to simplify analog to 
digital conversion and filtering. Some modern relays sampling in a range of 32 to 
128 samples per cycle or more for recording purposes, providing good spectral 
coverage. (The working group 2006, 21) 
Another aspect of analog filtering is the design of the filter itself. When high order 
filters are used, their response may not be ideally flat over the pass-band frequen-
cies. This should be considered when a detailed harmonic analysis is performed 
using records produced by protective relays. (The working group 2006, 19) 
The analog filter of digital relays is typically a low-pass filter, allowing the sub-
harmonics and dc components to pass through. However, the frequency response 
of the input magnetic modules at low frequencies may alter the low frequency 
components (at the level of a few Hz). This should be considered when analyzing 
sub-harmonics and decaying dc components.(The working group 2006, 19) 
4.4.2   Digital Signal Filtering of AC Signals 
The primary objective of digital filtering, as any other filters, is to filter out un-
wanted components of the applied signals, i.e. the dc component. To accomplish 
this, the filters must include a differentiating portion that ideally should match the 
L/R constant of the primary circuit. The accuracy of input signal and recorded 
34 
 
data is impacted by the performance of any digital filtering applied to the AC in-
puts. Digital filtering is applied especially in protection relays, as relays process 
the sampled data to make appropriate protection function decisions. A proper 
analysis of recorded data requires understanding any digital filtering applied to the 
AC input signals. (The working group 2006, 19) 
Digital relays tend to a record sampled data after digital filtering. Newer digital 
relays record raw samples prior to digital filtering. This not only widens the re-
sulting frequency spectrum of the recorded waveforms, but also ensures that the 
stored information does not depend on any proprietary digital signal processing 
algorithms. Other methods used on a limited basis include converting the sampled 
waveforms to RMS or other application specific values. (The working group 
2006, 20) 
4.5  Intelligent Electronic Devices 
This chapter discusses IEDs in general and introduces their role in the SCADA 
system. Finally such important protection function are discussed which could be 
used for data validation. 
Intelligent Electronic Device (IED) is a general term for microprocessor based 
equipment that is used for maintenance, control, protection and monitoring of the 
process. Protection relays manufactured these days are primarily IEDs. With 
available microprocessor technology, a single unit can perform several protective, 
control, and similar functions. Whereas before the microprocessor technology a 
single unit would contain only one protection function and if several protection 
functions were required one would have to combine a number of different units of 
protection relays. The processing power of digital electronic devices is one of the 
main reasons to replace these old analog devices. The ease of digital data ex-
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change is another very important reason to substitute traditional analog instru-
ments. 
Typically there are three categories of input sensors or transducers for IEDs. Two 
of these are analog – current and voltage, and the other is digital, which reflects 
the status and change-of-state information for selected equipment operations. (The 
working group 2006, 23) 
IEDs and their implementation in power substations facilitate enhanced data ac-
quisition. The amount of data is increased and all data cannot be utilized, but of-
fering already much better monitoring of the loading and switching status within 
the substations. Both analog and digital (status) data can be collected from various 
locations within the substation and processed in certain location. This location can 
be the IEDs itself or the data can be transferred to various applications. In the fu-
ture IED will process more data more effectively in the substation. (Djokic et al. 
2005 pp. 3 ; The working group 2006, 28) 
4.5.1  Overcurrent Protection 
Overcurrent protection is used against short circuit faults and heavy overloads. 
Overcurrent protection functions offer maybe the easiest and the most economical 
protection for many equipment. Nowadays IEDs include several overcurrent 
stages which can be adjusted separately. The IED measures the phase current and 
the protection function is sensitive for the highest of the three phase currents. 
Whenever the highest value exceeds the pick-up setting of a particular stage, this 
stage picks up and a start signal is issued. If the fault situation remains on longer 
than the operation delay setting, a trip signal is issued. The time delay may be a 
constant or inverse type. Inverse delay means that the operation time depends on 
the amount the measured current exceeds the pick-up setting. The bigger the fault 
current is the faster will be the operation. 
36 
 
4.5.2  Differential Protection 
Differential protection is widely used to protect generators, transformers and bus-
bars. A differential relay measures currents from each phase in two different 
places. For normal operation or if a fault is outside of the two sets of current trans-
former, entering (I1) and leaving (I2) phase currents is equal. If the fault occurs 
between the two sets of the current transformers, one or more of the phase cur-
rents will increase whereas the current on the other point will either decrease or 
increase and flow in the opposite direction. The figure 12 shows the idea. 
 
Figure 12: Single line diagram of busbar differential protection 
One application of this is high impedance differential relaying based on the con-
servative premise that the CT´s on one side of the protected target perform per-
fectly for an external fault and the other set of CT´s saturate completely. It takes 
advantage of the fact that the voltage appearing across the relay is limited for ex-
ternal fault to the voltage drop which is produced by the maximum secondary 
current flowing through the leads from the relay to the saturated CT and its inter-
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nal resistance. For an internal fault, the voltage will approach the open-circuited 
CT voltage  
Another solution is a percentage differential relay which solves the problems of 
poor sensitivity and slow operation. The inputs from the two sets of the current 
transformers are used to generate a restraint quantity. This is then compared to the 
difference of these two currents. The operation is produced as a result of the com-
parison of the difference to the restraint. This desensitizes the relay high external 
fault currents. The relay should operate if formula 3 is fulfilled 
       (2) 
where k is the proportion of the operating coil current to the restraint current and 
it is typically set between 10 - 40%. 
The current required for the relay´s operation increases with the magnitude of the 
fault current. The percentage of increases may be constant or the percentage of 
increases may vary with the external fault current. The effect of the restrain on 
internal fault is negligible because the operation quantity is weighted and re-
sponds to the total secondary fault current. (Elmore 2004, 169) 
Multifunction microprocessor relays do not have a physical operating winding, 
the difference of the restrain currents being computed mathematically by the algo-
rithm. 
4.5.3  Unbalance Protection 
Unbalanced protection is based on information that any set of unbalanced three-
phase quantities could be expressed as the sum of three symmetrical sets of bal-
anced phasors. There are three sets of independent components in a three-phase 
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system: positive, negative and zero for both current and voltage. Positive se-
quence voltages are supplied by generators within the system and are always pre-
sent. A second set of balanced phasors are also equal in magnitude and displaced 
120 degrees apart, but display a counter-clockwise rotation sequence of R-S-T, 
which represents a negative sequence. The final set of balanced phasors is equal in 
magnitude and in phase with each other, however since there is no rotation se-
quence this is known as a zero sequence. (Protection Basics 2007, 79-80) The 
figure shows the different phasor components. 
 
Figure 13: Positive, negative and zero sequence components 
The symmetrical components can be used to determine any unbalanced current or 
voltage (IR, IS, IT or UR, VS, UT which reference unbalanced line-to-neutral pha-
sors) as follows: (Protection Basics 2007, 79-80) 
 IR = I1 + I2 + I0  UR = U1 + U2 + U0 
 IS = a2 I1 + aI2 + I0 US = a2 U1 + aU2 + U0 
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 IT = aI1 + a2 I2 + I0 UT = aU1 + a2 U2 + U0 
where “a” operator shifts a vector by an angle of 120 degrees counter-clockwise. 
Under a normal condition, the power system is considered to be essentially a 
symmetrical system and therefore only positive sequence currents and voltages 
exist. At the time of a fault, positive, negative and possibly zero sequence currents 
and voltages exist. Using real world phase voltages and currents along with 
Fortescue’s formulas, all positive, negative and zero sequence currents can be 
calculated. Protection relays use these sequence components along with phase 
current and/or voltage data as the input to protective elements. (Protection Basics 
2007, 79-80) 
4.5.4 Earth Fault Protection 
An earth fault relay is overcurrent relay connected to the star point circuit of a set 
of 3-phase CTs and it measured the sum of current. Under normal conditions the 
sum of phase-currents I1, I2 and I3 i.e. zero current 3I0 should be close to zero. 
Figure 14 shows how these CTs are connected typically to the relay. 
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Figure 14: IED with earth fault measurements. (Terminal Diagram REF615) 
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5   TOPOLOGY MONITORING IN REAL-TIME 
In a power system, topology is defined by the connectivity between power system 
components like transformers, circuit breakers, transmission lines and loads. The 
reliable information about topology is important for many actions which are exe-
cuted in the system. Generally, the topology of the network is updated from the 
status of the switching devices. The common way is to monitor the status of the 
CB or measurent element and update the topology based on these information. For 
example, in older systems RTUs and nowadays IEDs are wired to the CB limit 
switches that operate when the breaker mechanism changes state. (Djekic 2007, 6) 
The real-time monitoring is typically done through RTUs of the SCADA and the 
changes in the CB status are reported to the SCADA interface. (Kezunovic 2006, 
1) 
Today CB status is monitored from the control circuit limit switches as “a” and 
“b”. These contacts are designed in such a way that an open and close state is easy 
to determine by verifying the opposite status of the “a” and ”b” contact position. 
By monitoring open/closed status of all CBs, it is possible to create a wide 
bus/feeder topology configuration of the power system. As it is shown in figure 
15, the “a” and “b” contact signals present the voltage across auxiliary switches 
that specify the open or close status of the CB (Djekic 2007, 6).  
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Figure 15: Traditional SCADA topology (Djekic 2007, 6) 
The reliability of the contact “a” and “b” indication has been a concern due to 
relatively frequent errors in the readings of the contacts, that may cause malfunc-
tion, or errors in the SCADA communication. (Kezunovic 2006, pp 1) In some 
cases, the auxiliary limit switch does not show the real circuit breaker status due 
to mechanical, electrical or wiring problem. Most of the circuit breaker failures 
that have been detected in the field can be defined to mechanical failures and dif-
ficulties related to the auxiliary control circuits. Approximately 25% of the major 
and minor failures of circuit breakers in service are caused by control circuit fail-
ures (Djekic 2007, 4). 
Two general issues are associated with determination of the topology, namely the 
system wide attempt to improve overall network topology determination and the 
local attempt to improve status determination of a single CB. Locally at the sub-
station level, topology issues include the consideration of the automated analysis 
of the CB status based on signal measurements from the CB control circuitry but 
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also the consideration of the topology consistency check based on measurements 
from substation IEDs. (Kezunovic 2006, 1) 
5.1  Monitoring 
Monitoring, especially if it is executed in real-time, requires the analog measure-
ments of current and voltages as well as measurement of CB status (Kezunovic 
2006, 3). Data acquisition software should run “nonstop” that operator can main-
tain the process effectively in real-time. There is also applications like disturbance 
recorders that can be used to detect and analyze faults and such occurrences af-
terwards but the use in the normal condition are not useful. 
The next chapter discusses the possibilities which can help to define the system 
topology reliably. 
5.1.1  Multiple and Redundant Information 
If one signal is available from several sources, comparison can basically be per-
formed quite easily and decide if the signals match. Table 2 shows an example 
situation where the redundant signals exist and how the redundancy could be de-
tected. (Djokic et al. 2005, 9) 
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Table 2: Description of the types of signals for DFRs, DPRs, and CBMs. 
              (Djokic et al. 2005, 4) 
 
As it can be noticed, the redundancy exists and comparison is possible to execute. 
In the case that the signals do match, the level of the confidence for data is pretty 
high. If these signals differ from each other, a 2-out-of-3 voting logic may be im-
plemented to select a more reliable outcome. (Djokic et al., 2005, 9) However, 
this kind of solution is very rare in SCADA system. 
One benefit of the correlation between analog measurements and CB status signal 
is an ability precisely to define the sequence of events related to fault clearing. 
This improves the analysis of operation of a single circuit breaker but also enables 
the analysis of operation of multiple circuit breakers. (Kezunovic 2006, 8) If the 
feeder includes several CBs, it is possible to monitor these CBs at the same time 
by combining their statuses and set the state as one equivalent circuit breaker. 
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The correlation also helps in a situation when a dynamic change in the substation 
topology needs to be verified using analog measurements. This can be signifi-
cantly facilitated if both the CB limit switch changes and phasor changes are 
measured with a common time reference. This assures that a given measurement 
scan is “aligned” in time avoiding possible confusions about the sequence of 
events (Kezunovic 2006, 8).  
Determining power system topology very accurately in that way using SCADA 
information only is not always possible. Utilizing data from different IEDs that 
are connected to a given circuit breaker improves robustness in determining the 
topology but it may also need special solutions and an application for the data 
acquisition and integrating such an application with the existing SCADA system 
is not trivial (Djokic et al., 2005, 9). 
5.1.2  Circuit Breaker Status Monitoring  
The mentioned IEDs enable monitoring of the functional tasks of the circuit 
breaker: clearing the faults and changing the topology of the power system. In 
either case, an automatic controller or an operator initiating the circuit breaker 
operation, the final outcome of a circuit breaker changing its state or remaining in 
the same one depends on the function that the circuit breaker was supposed to 
support. For example, the voltage and current signals should change if there is a 
fault on the transmission line, the relay should determine the fault location and 
fault type leading to a decision to trip (or not to trip), and if there is a trip or close 
command tasks, the CB control circuit monitor records the behavior of the control 
circuitry. The whole sequence can tell if the circuit breaker is operating correctly, 
and if not, what are the possible reasons. (Djokic et al., 2005, 9) 
One possible solution is the CB Monitor which would be permanently connected 
to the substation CBs. CBM records detailed information about each CB operation 
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in real-time, regardless of whether the operation is initiated manually by the op-
erator or automatically by the protection and control equipment and stores them in 
COMTRADE file format. The idea of the system is that after the data is collected, 
it is automatically processed to extract the information of interest, which is then 
distributed to various users (Djekic 2007, 3). 
5.2  Signal Selection for Topology 
There are a large number of quantities and signals that could be monitored for 
circuit breaker and topology monitoring purposes. There are also many methods 
to measure or calculate those parameters. Traditionally calculations are made by 
some other program than SCADA. For SCADA the signals for monitoring should 
be chosen in such a way that it gives enough information to make conclusions 
about the circuit breaker and system condition and operations without calcula-
tions. It is important to have a complete set of quantities/signals to be able to per-
form quality analysis and give reliable circuit breaker status information. (Jak-
ovljevic et al., 2) 
Data is collected from circuit breakers in a substation, and the system combines 
the data to make deductions about the system topology and operation performance 
that could help in increasing the system reliability. More precise and reliable as-
sessment of system topology may be achieved by integrating redundant data from 
SCADA system and monitoring system (Djekic 2007, 4). 
5.3  Data Validation 
As it was mentioned earlier there is more information available than is utilized. 
After the suitable signals have been determined a minimum requirements for the 
signals and records have also to be defined. The signals may suffer from various 
interferences along transferring so the certain error handling routines have already 
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been included in the protocols. These methods can be said to be constant and it is 
not possible or even needed to configure these routines 
The situation is different in database applications and other programs which util-
ize some imported data. It is important that applications operate on clean and right 
data. In order the applications to operate as planned some minimum requirement 
for the imported data must be defined. In order to meet these basic requirements, 
it is up to user or routines in the program to confirm that data is valid. Validation 
could involve some checks that can be performed on the record immediately after 
data has been recorded or like the databases the routines are typically executed in 
certain time interval, for example once a day. Databases enable also to build vali-
dation routines very accurately and one widely used method is to validate the im-
ported data statistically. This kind of application is very complex and typically it 
needs an external mathematical. 
In power systems the condition monitoring are regularly executed by measure-
ments and condition state of device is analyzed based on this data (Lindh 1997, 
89). In the condition monitoring the state of the device is validated by: 
 •  Alarm limits, if the limit is exceeded or variation of the  
      measuring value 
 •  Trend monitoring. If the values are changed in long time period it 
    indicates the load changes or changes in the use. A simple solution  
  is that quantity peaks generate alarm, and the manual condition  
  analyzes can be executed. 
It is possible to use these methods in SCADA but it has to be known how the lim-
its can be set reliable. 
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5.3.1  Check Using Redundant Current Measurements 
There could be assemblies which contain circuit breakers with two current trans-
formers in their bushings. The redundant measurements of current are acquired 
from RTU or some other IED monitoring the feeder. In these cases, it needs to be 
decided what the value for current is in the feeder but it also must be made possi-
ble to combine these two measurements. Ideally, both values should be equal. The 
decision which one of the two measurements is right is simple if both measure-
ments are the same but becomes a little more difficult when values are different. 
(Jakovljevic et al., 3-4) The algorithm flowchart is represented in figure 16. 
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 Figure 16: Algorithm for checking the feeder current consistency. 
                                   (Jakovljevic et al., 4) 
This algorithm can handle all the feeders in the station. First, it determines if there 
is a redundant measurement of current in the feeder. In the feeders where redun-
dant measurement exists, consistency check can be proposed. The criterion is that 
the absolute value of the difference between the phasor currents should be less 
than certain percent of the absolute value of the larger current.  In this case the 
percent is defined by variable MADMD (Maximum Allowable Double Measure-
ment Discrepancy). This criterion has to be satisfied for all three phases. The pre-
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sumption is that there will be no discrepancy in the phase angle without a discrep-
ancy in the magnitude. (Jakovljevic et al., 4)  
If the criterion is satisfied, the current in the feeder will be selected one of the 
measurements (since they are the same to the precision determined by MADMD 
variable). (Jakovljevic et al., 4)  
In the situation when none of the phase current criteria is satisfied, an alarm is 
generated. The current in a feeder is determined as an average value of the two 
current measurements. An alternative to this conclusion would be to mark the 
current in this feeder, and upon additional checks, to reject one of the measure-
ments (if it is bad data). (Jakovljevic et al., 4)  
5.3.2  Check Using Measurements Without Redundant Information 
1. Current 
The validating method introduced in chapter 5.3.1 can be applied although there 
are not two measurements in the feeder. The validation routine bases on the high-
est measured phase current (Imax) and two other phase currents (i.e. IR, Is) are 
compared to Imax current. If the measured value in the two phases (IR, Is) drops 
smaller than certain percent value of the Imax the alarm is generated. This percent 
value could be i.e. 15% of Imax (0,15* Imax ). (Yliaho 2008) 
It is good to notice that this kind of method is much more effective if the breaker 
statuses from the certain feeder is also considered  
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2. Voltage 
This same method works with voltages and validating process can be very similar 
as it was with current. The maximum measured voltage (Umax) is picked and two 
other phases are compared for Umax and if limits are set right, that kind of function 
works quite reliably. (Yliaho 2008) 
5.3.3  Check Using Kirchoff's Current Law 
This type of check can be performed for all the nodes where two or more feeders 
meet and the measurements of current exist in all those feeders. Kirchoff's Current 
Law (KCL) can be stated in words: 
”At any node in an electrical circuit, the sum of currents flowing into the node is 
equal to the sum of currents flowing out of the node”. 
Or in mathematical terms: 
         (3) 
The algorithm is shown in figure 17. 
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Figure 17: Algorithm for the check of Kirchhoff´s Current            
          Law (Jakovljevic et al., 4)  
First, the node classification is checked. Only the busbars and substation internal 
nodes are taken into consideration. First Kirchhoff's law is not performed for ex-
ternal nodes since they split one feeder (that connects two substations) into two 
parts and usually there is no current measurement available at least on one side. 
(Jakovljevic et al., 4)  
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For busbars or internal nodes, the incident feeders need to be determined and a 
check is performed to see if all of them are equipped with RTUs or IEDs measur-
ing the currents. (Jakovljevic et al., 4)  
For the internal nodes, there is enough information to check KCL. Currents in the 
node incident feeders are summed considering orientation of each current (leaving 
or entering the node). Then the First Kirchhoff's law condition can be checked for 
each phase separately. Ideally the sum of currents should be zero, but naturally, 
certain error should be allowed. This is defined with the variable KCLE. (Jak-
ovljevic et al., 4)  
5.3.4  Check of the Feeder Status 
The determination of feeder switching statuses can be accomplished considering 
all the switching devices (switching elements) in particular feeders. Typically 
there is either one circuit breaker with one disconnector or one circuit breaker 
with truck (or disconnector) and line disconnector in a feeder (branch) of the me-
dium voltage substation. 
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 Figure 18: The feeder with one circuit breaker and two disconnectors. The 
                           different switching statuses of the one device are also shown. 
As it has mentioned earlier, the feeder status in the topology can also be deter-
mined based on the status of CB.  For feeders with three switching devices, ap-
plied logic is shown in the table 3. 
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 Table 3:  Applied logic for check of the feeder status in the case of one  
   circuit breakers (CB) and two disconnectors (DC). 
 
The function checks switching devices statuses of the feeder. The function consist 
of two if-commands. First, if all status values are "1" (closed) then feeder status is 
“3” and equivalent circuit breaker status is also closed. Next, there is a situation 
when all switching devices are open (“2”) then feeder status is “6” and the equiva-
lent circuit breaker is “open”. The equivalent circuit breaker is defined “open” 
every time as one of the switching devices has a value which differs from ”1”. It 
is possible to define different indications for the feeder (Bad, Unknown etc.) if the 
one of switching devices statuses in certain feeder differs from “1” or “2”. 
The routine of checking the feeder (branch) status can be shown as in figure 19.  
 
DC1	   1	   2	   1	   2	   1	   2	   1	   2	  
CB	   1	   1	   2	   2	   1	   1	   2	   2	  
DC2	   1	   1	   1	   1	   2	   2	   2	   2	  
Feeder	  Status	   3	   4	   4	   5	   4	   5	   5	   6	  
Position	   Close	   Open	   Open	   Open	   Open	   Open	   Open	   Open	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   1	  =	  Close,	  2	  =	  Open,	  other	  =	  Unknown	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Figure 19: Algorithm for feeder status determination. (Jakovljevic et al., 5)   
  
5.3.5  Check of Feeder Currents and Topology Data 
Consistency checks between feeder current values and feeder statuses (topology 
data) are more accurate than checking the current or status value alone. Checks 
can also be executed for each phase separately. As it has noticed, there are several 
possible combinations of feeder current values and feeder statuses. Each possibil-
ity reflects different situation and has distinct impact on the conclusion. If there is 
an exact value for the statuses (open or close) it can be found correspondence be-
tween feeder current and feeder status. Consistency could be fulfilled for two ba-
sic cases: 
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 1)  when the equivalent circuit breaker is “close” and there is some cur-
rent in the feeder (branch) 
 2) when the equivalent circuit breaker is "open" and there is no current in 
the feeder ( branch) (Jakovljevic et al., 5). 
In the case the equivalent circuit breaker is “open” but there is some current in the 
feeder inconsistency can be found out and the alarm can be generated. Due to 
some transient processes in the circuit breaker or delay of updating of the topol-
ogy, it is possible that the current has some value greater than zero even after the 
circuit breaker has chanced "open" status. (Jakovljevic et al., 5) The flowchart is 
shown in figure 20. 
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Figure 20: Algorithm for feeder status determination. (Jakovljevic 2003, 42)  
The case when the equivalent circuit breaker is closed and there is no current in 
the feeder is not necessarily inconsistent because it is possible that there is not any 
load in the feeder. As well if there is no voltage difference between feeder termi-
nals, feeder current will be zero even if the switching device is closed. In order to 
investigate that, the voltage measurements at the feeder terminal nodes could be 
validated. When both feeder terminals are equipped with voltage measurements, 
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absolute value of the difference between voltage phasors can be validated. If the 
validated voltage difference is greater than some already preset value, bad topol-
ogy data exists. Then the alarm is generated and it is more reliable to change the 
value of feeder status to "bad" rather than to “open”. (Jakovljevic 2003, 43) 
When the actual voltage difference is small, the situation is considered normal 
since the voltage difference is insufficient to create noticeable current through the 
feeder even when the feeder switching device status is “close”. The consistency is 
fulfilled. (Jakovljevic 2003, 43)  
The last situation is when the equivalent circuit breaker is bad. The consistency 
check can not generate respective result. Actually the feeder current value can be 
checked and if it is greater than zero, it is possible that one of the disconnect 
switches in the feeder had erroneous status (undefined or fault) reported (which 
caused "unknown" feeder status). (Jakovljevic 2003, 44)  
5.3.6  Time-Series Consistency Check 
The validation routine can be executed also by checking a change from the previ-
ous state to the current state. Then the analog set of measurements and topology 
data is examined together. Their values are compared between the present and the 
last recorded value. This routine needs a database or some other reservoir where 
the previous state information is available. (Jakovljevic et al., 5)  
The assumption is that only a change in topology can cause a change in analog 
measurements. What is a normal change of an analog measurement should be 
taken conditionally since there is always fluctuation in the power flow even in the 
normal operation of power network. Any change in analog measurement less than 
some already preset value is actually not considered a change. (Jakovljevic et al., 
5-6)  
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The analog and topology changes since the last snapshot are detected. The routine 
examines the consistency of four possible combinations. One combination is 
when there is a change in both topology and analog measurement. The other one 
is when there is no change in those two. Both combinations inflict validation. 
(Jakovljevic et al., 6) 
The third case is a change in topology without a change in analog measurement. 
This can happen for example when the equivalent circuit breaker changes from 
"closed" to "open" and there was no current in the feeder before it was opened 
(i.e. no load). The feeder status can also change due to topology data error. Since 
the true reason for the topology change is unknown, it is recommended to take 
caution due to possibly bad data. (Jakovljevic et al., 6)  
The last case is a change in some analog measurement with no change in topol-
ogy. This is more complex case than the previous one and it is more likely that the 
bad data is causing it. It is possible that due to some remote fault, sudden change 
in the power flow caused a change in analog measurements and no activity is nec-
essary. On the other hand, rechecking the suspicious data can discover some local 
instrument malfunction. (Jakovljevic 2003, 46). The flowchart of time series 
checking is shown in figure 21. 
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Figure 21: Consistency check based on time series. (Jakovljevic 2003, 45) 
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6  IMPLEMENTATION OF DATA VALIDATION IN MICROSCADA 
The last part of the thesis introduces the solutions of the validation routines which 
were chosen to the MicroSCADA. A user interface was made with the Scil pro-
gramming language which has been especially developed for MicroSCADA pro-
gramming. The user interface was built so that it is easy to check validation states 
from the different location in the substation.  
6.1  Power Balance 
The first validation routine checks how big the difference is between entering and 
leaving power flows in the substation. Based on the Kirchhoff´s first law, the dif-
ference between these powers should be close to zero. The substation was figured 
out by a simplified rectangle and the rectangle changes its color depending on the 
magnitude of the power difference. The percent value of the difference is calcu-
lated by formula 4 
          (4)  
where, Pout is power leaving from the substation and Pin is power entering the sub-
station.  
The supposition is that power cannot flow from low-voltage level to higher. If the 
power flows from the lower voltage level to the higher voltage level, the alarm is 
generated.  The difference between alarm states are defined by constant parame-
ters which can be changed but it must be made straight to the code. The alarming 
colors change depending on how big the difference of the powers is. The colors 
are defined as follows:
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  30% > = P  the color is green 
  30% < P =< 50%  the color is yellow 
  50% < P >=100% the color is red  
  100% > P the color is red 
The states are shown in the figure 22. 
 
Figure 22: Different alarm states and percent values 
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As it was noticed earlier the powers should flow from the higher voltage level to 
lower and if this is not satisfied, the red alarm and text ”BAD” is generated. The 
figure 23 shows the situation. The second situation, when the alarm text ”BAD” is 
generated, is if the power difference is more than 100%. 
 
Figure 23: The value is over 100% or power flow is not valid. 
Respect states for the measurements are used in the MicroSCADA. These states 
are defined by Object Status (OS) attributes. The status defines if the measure-
ment is fault, obsolete, etc. If the OS attribute gets the value 0, the measurement is 
valid. The OS attributes of the powers, used in this window, are collected from the 
database and if the OS attribute is different than zero, it is defined as ”Bad”. If 
there is one bad status in the power measurements, the indication is defined to be 
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as yellow, and if there is more than one ”Bad” status, the color is red. If there is 
not any indication the color is green. The different situations are shown in figure 
24. 
 
Figure 24: Zero, one and over two “Bad” statuses 
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6.2  Equivalent Breaker - Phase Currents 
The second validation routine is to check the switching state and phase currents in 
the certain bay. The routine combine the switching devices in the bay and com-
pare this status in the phase currents. The combined switching devices are called 
equivalent breaker. The combination is built based on information that in Mi-
croSCADA the Object Value defines the state of the switching device. In this rou-
tine the status are handled so that 
   1 = Close  
   2 = Open  
   other = Unknown 
In the process picture in figure 24 the two switching devices are handled as a one 
equivalent breaker and the value for equivalent breaker is calculated from statuses 
of both switching devices. Earthing switch does not have any effect in the equiva-
lent breaker i.e. it is not considered. The calculation is simplified sum of the 
statuses so that if  Q1=1 and Q0=1 then feeder status is 2 and equivalent breaker 
status is close. According to fundamentals of the electrical circuits there can be 
current in the feeder only if equivalent breaker is closed (feeder status is 2). This 
state is indicated by green ”OK” text. If the equivalent breaker is something else 
than 2 and there is current in phases the yellow ”Bad” text is generated. The figure 
25 shows the indications 
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Figure 25: Indication are shown by text and colors 
  
6.3  Primary Measurements 
The third validation routine concentrates on primary measurements from active 
power (P), reactive power (Q) and phase currents (I1, I2, I3). The window indi-
cates the value of the measurements and as it has been done before, the “Bad” 
statuses are indicated by colors. There is also an info square in the window which 
tells if the measurement is “OK” or if the measurement includes a bad status, the 
info square turns to “FAULTY VALUE”. The figure 26 shows the window. 
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Figure 26: Primary measurements are shown by text and colors 
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7  CONCLUSION 
If reliable validation routines are needed, a good knowledge on the primary proc-
ess but also the SCADA system itself is required. The different SCADA systems 
handle signals in different ways e.g. a significance of the status signals can vary 
depending on the program. This same variation has to be noticed in protocols. For 
example, open value of the circuit breaker may differ between protocols or if this 
same signal is transferred between SCADA applications and the open status might 
change to close in the end.  
It is possible to improve data validation in SCADA system with fairly simple 
methods. The simple program, as it has been introduced in the thesis, gives a no-
tice to the operator and if there are ”Bad” values in the SCADA database. In some 
cases suspicious data can be noticed and reported by the IED which makes it eas-
ier to start locating the source for bad or suspicious data. Data validation in the 
SCADA system is an interesting issue and only ”the sky is the limit” to create 
routines for validation. However, there are also many challenges. It is not easy to 
build such a program which notices intelligently and reliably faulty or suspicious 
changes in the process. The program created in this thesis does not notice that, the 
updating intervals can differ between measurement values in the database. For 
example, the values that are used in formula 4, can vary to such a range that the 
wrong alarms are generated. Essentially, the calculation works well if the measur-
ing is happening in real-time but this is not the case always. There can be a large 
power difference between entering and leaving power even if there are no faults in 
the process. If the measurement updating is not in real-time, one solution is to 
compare the measurement values with to values calculated from the database his-
tory. Then, of course, a special history database is needed and the estimation cal-
culations have to be done in the history database. That kind of estimation is not  
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simple and if it is in use, the calculation has been executed by external mathe-
matical program. 
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